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Overdetermination and Elimination 
I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about 
the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via 
claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to 
reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no 'weak 
overdetermination’; i.e. that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient 
causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination 
isn't obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than 
merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to 
tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their 
conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same 
motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue 
further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at 
whom the arguments are directed. 
1. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on two arguments that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of 
entity to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. The 
first argument is Jaegwon Kim’s influential exclusion argument from the philosophy of mind (see e.g. Kim 
1998, 2005). The second argument is Trenton Merricks’s (2001) argument for eliminativism about ordinary 
objects. In brief, Kim argues that given that physical properties are causally sufficient for any would-be-
effects of mental properties, and given that there is no widespread causal overdetermination, we must 
either identify mental properties with physical properties or accept that they are causally inert. Similarly, 
Merricks argues that given that particles arranged object-wise are causally sufficient for any would-be-effect 
of objects, and given that there is no widespread causal overdetermination, we must either identify objects 
with the physical particles that make them up or accept that they are causally inert.1 Merricks argues further 
that if there were any ordinary objects they would do causal work, and that ordinary objects could not be 
identified with the particles that make them up at any given time. He concludes that there are no ordinary 
objects. Although Kim doesn’t normally present his argument as eliminativist, it too has fairly immediate 
eliminativist consequences. First, if we assume with Kim that, as far as properties are concerned, to be is to 
have causal powers, the choice Kim offers is really between identification and elimination. Second, if we 
assume that mental properties are multiply realizable by physical properties, then it seems that mental 
properties could not be identified with physical properties.2 For, whatever else identity might require, it 
requires at least coextensionality. These two assumptions are commonplace. If they are right, the real moral 
of Kim’s argument is that there are no mental properties.   
Kim’s argument has inspired a huge debate, and has prompted various significant ontological and 
metaphysical revisions. Merricks’s argument has caused less of a stir, but those who find Kim’s argument 
compelling ought also to find Merricks’s argument compelling. For the arguments share the same core 
structure. We can formulate this as follows:  
                                                
1 This argument is also hinted at, but not developed, by Peter van Inwagen (1990: 118, 122).  
2 See e.g. Putnam (1967), Fodor (1974).  
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1. Xs are causally sufficient for the would-be effects of Ys  
2. The would-be effects of Ys are not causally overdetermined 
 Therefore, 
 C. Ys are either identical with Xs or they are causally inert 
If we replace ‘X’ with ‘physical causes’ and ‘Y’ with ‘mental causes’ we get the core of Kim’s argument 
against non-reductive physicalism. If, on the other hand, we replace ‘X’ with ‘particles arranged objectwise’ 
and ‘Y’ with ‘material object’ we get the core of Merricks’s argument against objects. Both arguments 
employ a number of further claims, but unless this core structure is sound, neither argument gets off the 
ground.3 I shall argue that this core is rotten.  
The core argument is not valid as it stands and Kim and Merricks must rely on extra claims to validate 
their versions of it. To this end, Merricks introduces a much weaker than ordinary notion of 
overdetermination, while Kim puts down an extra principle – the exclusion principle – designed to take us 
from the denial of ordinary overdetermination to identity. I will argue that although these strategies look 
different on their face, they boil down to the same thing; namely, to denying that weak overdetermination 
of the Merricksian kind ever occurs. One problem for both arguments is that it is far from obvious why we 
ought to find weak overdetermination objectionable; a point well made by Theodore Sider (2003). But I 
want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination 
arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist this kind of overdetermination 
and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their 
case on the same motivating principle, which I shall call the principle of additional causal powers. This 
principle, I argue further, is untenable. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against 
those at whom the arguments are directed.  
2. The Sufficiency Claims 
The principal focus of this paper is the move from the causal sufficiency of one entity to the reduction or 
elimination of another. But before turning to this, I want to say a few words about the sufficiency claims 
that Kim and Merricks’s arguments employ and why I think we should grant them.  
It seems to me that Merricks is right when he claims that particles arranged objectwise are causally 
sufficient for the would-be effects of objects. For instance, when some particles arranged baseballwise are 
hurled against a windowpane, to use Merricks’s example, these particles are sufficient, in the circumstances, 
for the window shattering. Once you have these particles acting in concert, nothing further needs to be 
added in order to bring about the effect. The circumstances are very important, of course, but I take it that 
things are only ever sufficient given the circumstances, and that any claim about sufficiency must be taken 
to implicitly assume this. What’s more, Merricks’s sufficiency claim concerns not just particles, but particles 
arranged objectwise. Given what Merricks means by this, his sufficiency claim is practically irresistible.4 Here is 
his definition of what it is for particles, or atoms as he calls them, to be arranged statuewise:  
                                                
3 Indeed, this is true not just of Kim and Merricks’s arguments, but of overdetermination arguments more generally. What we have 
here is the core not just of the principal argument against non-reductive physicalism, but also of the principal argument in favour of 
physicalism (see e.g. Papineau 2002). My discussion will apply to these arguments too. 
4 I should say that Merricks talks of particles being arranged as particular types of objects (e.g. ‘baseballwise’, ‘tablewise’, ‘chairwise’), 
but I shall use the term ‘objectwise’ to keep things simple. Those who worry that there is no such thing as an objectwise arrangement 
of particles, on grounds that ‘object’ is not a sortal term, can take ‘objectwise’ to be a placeholder for more specific terms. 
  3  3 
Atoms are arranged statuewise if and only if they both have the properties and also stand in the relations 
to microscopica upon which, if statues existed, those atom’s composing a statue would non-trivially 
supervene. (Merricks 2001: 4) 
Assuming that this definition applies to objects more generally, the circumstances where particles are 
arranged objectwise are precisely the ones in which the particles compose objects if there are any objects. 
More, the would-be effects of objects are those that objects would cause if they existed. So it is hard to see 
how particles arranged object-wise could fail to be causally sufficient for any would-be effect of objects. It 
is important to note also that this sufficiency cannot it seems be explained by particles’ arranged objectwise 
being identical to objects. For objects have properties that particles arranged objectwise do not, such as 
being able to survive changes in their parts. But then objects could not be identical to the particles that 
compose them at any given time.  
Kim’s claim, that physical causes are sufficient for the would-be effects of mental causes, is perhaps not 
as immediately compelling as Merricks’s claim. But, at least as far as the would-be physical effects of mental 
causes are concerned, it falls out of a thesis that is accepted by most contemporary philosophers of mind. 
This thesis is known as the causal closure of the physical, or the completeness of physics, and states that 
“physics is causally and explanatorily self-sufficient: there is no need to go outside the physical domain to find 
a cause, or a causal explanation, of a physical event.” (Kim 2005: 16). If true, then any would-be physical 
effect of a mental cause has sufficient physical causes, such that nothing outside the physical domain is 
ever required to explain their occurrence. More, given another widely accepted thesis, the thesis of the 
supervenience of the mental on the physical, it seems that the mental must have some physical effects if it 
is to have any effects at all. There are various ways in which we might characterize supervenience, but the 
core idea common to all formulations is that if A supervenes on B, then no change in A is possible without 
some corresponding change in B. So, if the mental supervenes on the physical, then no change is possible 
in the mental without a corresponding change in the physical. And that, it is reasonable to think, means 
that mental causes must cause some physical effects in order to cause anything at all.5  
3. Standard Overdetermination, Weak Overdetermination and the Exclusion Principle 
Let us turn then to the move from sufficiency to identification or elimination. The first thing to note is that 
of course a given effect’s having a sufficient cause X does not entail that the effect has no other sufficient 
cause distinct from X. It is not only that an effect may have, and almost certainly will have, a number of 
sufficient causes occurring at different times. It may also have distinct sufficient causes occurring at the 
very same time.6 Given this, the move from the sufficiency of one cause to the elimination of another 
relies crucially on the denial of overdetermination. Whether the denial of overdetermination warrants this 
move, however, depends very much on the notion of overdetermination in play.  
The cases most naturally thought of as ones of overdetermination are cases where two causes operate 
through two distinct causal chains or nexuses; for example, when a window breaks from the impact of two 
baseballs thrown at it at once, or when an unfortunate man has a fatal heart attack at the same time as (but 
                                                
5 Strictly speaking, this doesn’t follow. It would be sufficient, for instance, if something other than the mental cause simultaneously 
caused the required physical change, but I ignore this possibility here.  
6 As is well known, the possibility of multiple sufficient causes raises some problems for counterfactual analyses of causation. But this 
is generally thought to show that something is amiss with counterfactual analyses rather than that we are wrong in thinking that 
effects might have multiple causes. 
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not because of) being struck by lightning. What is distinctive about such cases is not just that there are 
distinct causes, but that there are distinct and independent causes. The independence here consists in the fact 
that had either cause been removed from the circumstances (and not replaced by anything) the effect 
would have been brought about by the other cause. The death of the unfortunate man is overdetermined 
in this way, for instance, because had lightning not struck him, the heart attack would still have killed him, 
and had he not had the heart attack he would still have been killed by the lightning. Overdetermination of 
this sort is well named. For in all such cases there is a genuine excess of causes for the same effect, fitting 
the ‘over’ in overdetermination. Indeed, it is tempting to reserve the term ‘overdetermination’ for 
overdetermination of this kind. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, however, I will refer to this as 
‘standard overdetermination’.  
On the standard reading of overdetermination, everyone should be happy to grant the second premise 
of the core argument, whether we plug in Kim’s or Merricks’s values for the variables. For whether or not 
we can take objects and their composing particles, or mental causes and their accompanying physical 
causes, to be distinct causes, we surely cannot take them to be distinct and independent causes. Indeed, I know 
of nobody who wants to say that mental events cause things independently of happenings in the brain or 
that objects cause things independently of the matter out of which they are constituted. On this reading of 
the second premise, however, the argument is not valid. The causal sufficiency of Xs together with the 
denial of standard overdetermination could establish only the conclusion that the Ys do not cause their 
effects independently of Xs and that is considerably weaker than the intended conclusion. This is very 
important. It means that you cannot get from the conclusion that entities of a given kind do not cause 
things independently of entities of a second kind to the conclusion that entities of the first kind must be 
identified with entities of the second kind in order to cause anything at all without employing some further 
assumption. 
Merricks bridges this gap by employing a much weaker notion of overdetermination than the standard 
one, offering the following sufficient condition: 
An effect is overdetermined if the following are true: that effect is caused by an object; that object is 
causally irrelevant to whether some other—i.e. numerically distinct—object or objects cause that 
effect; and the other object or objects do indeed cause that effect. (2001: 58)7  
Causal irrelevance, in turn, is defined as follows: “O is causally irrelevant to whether the xs [i.e. O’s 
constituent particles], acting in concert, cause a certain effect E” if the following four conditions are met (i) 
O is not identical to one of the xs, (ii) O is not a partial cause of E alongside the xs, (iii) none of the xs 
cause O to cause E, and (iv) O does not cause any of the xs to cause E (2001: 58). The term ‘causal 
irrelevance’ is at best misleading, given this definition.8 But we can reformulate Merricks’s sufficient 
                                                
7 Merricks here intends ‘other objects’ to include the particles composing ordinary objects (or, rather, the particles that would 
compose ordinary objects if there were any).  
8 Just consider how the notion plays out in the case of objects and their constituent particles. Given this construal of causal 
irrelevance, we must grant that every object is causally irrelevant to its constituent atoms’ causing their effects. Objects are not 
identical to any of the particles that compose them. Nor can objects and their particles plausibly be seen as either partial joint causes 
or distinct links in a causal chain. In granting this, however, we ought to be very clear on just what the causal irrelevancy claim 
amounts to. It says that objects are not relevant in the ways specified in (i) to (iv) to their parts causing their effects. It is perfectly 
compatible with this for objects to cause the same effects as their parts do. And assuming that anything that causes an effect is causally 
relevant to that effect, objects may be causally relevant to their parts’ effects, even though they are causally irrelevant (in the sense of i-iv) 
to their parts causing these effects. What’s more, conditions (i)-(iv) do not even rule out objects’ being causally relevant to their parts 
causing their effects in some other, as yet unspecified way. It seems perfectly compatible with the claim that objects are causally 
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condition in neutral terms. Where e is the effect and c1 and c2 are the purported overdetermining causes, 
Merricks sufficient condition for overdetermination breaks down as follows:  
1) e is caused by c1 
2) e is caused by c2 
3) c1 is not identical to c2 
4) c1 is not a partial cause of e alongside c2 
5) c1 does not cause c2 to cause e 
6) c2 does not cause c1 to cause e 
Pulling this together, an effect is overdetermined on Merricks’s account if it has causes that are not 
identical (3), are not merely partial causes, but are each sufficient for the effect in question (1, 2, 4), and are 
not parts of a causal chain (5, 6). In brief:  
MOD:  An effect is overdetermined if it has numerically distinct sufficient causes that are not 
distinct links of a causal chain.9 
I shall refer to cases where this sufficient condition is met, but where the causes in question are not 
independent in the way characteristic of standard overdetermination, as cases of weak overdetermination, 
or Merricksian overdetermination.   
If we adopt Merricks’s sufficient condition for overdetermination, it is clear that any effect of an 
ordinary object would be overdetermined.10 More, if any effect of an ordinary object would be 
overdetermined, then of course any effect that is not overdetermined is not caused by an ordinary object. 
So on this reading, Merricks’s argument is valid. As we shall see, however, it is far from clear that we have 
any good reason to deny that ordinary objects and their parts overdetermine their effects in this sense. But 
before I go on to argue this, let us look at the other way Merricks might have gone to validate his 
argument; Kim’s way.  
Kim proposes to bridge the gap between sufficiency and identity with his exclusion principle: 
Exclusion Principle: “[n]o single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given 
time—unless it is a genuine case of overdetermination.” (Kim, 2005, p.42)  
By ‘genuine overdetermination’ Kim is explicit that he means standard overdetermination in the sense 
clarified above; i.e. overdetermination that “involves two or more separate and independent causal chains 
intersecting at a common effect.” (Kim 2005: 48). Further, by ‘more than one’ Kim has to mean 
‘numerically distinct’. Otherwise the principle could not establish the identity of mental and physical causes, 
and without this his argument will not succeed. So Kim’s exclusion principle must be understood as saying 
that no single event can have numerically distinct sufficient causes occurring at any given time—unless the 
causes in question are independent. Which entails that:  
EP*:  no single effect can have numerically distinct and dependent sufficient causes occurring at the same 
time.  
                                                                                                                                      
irrelevant in this sense, for instance, that the parts of an object cause their effects precisely because they compose objects that instantiate 
certain properties. It is in light of this that I think the notion of causal irrelevance is best dropped out of the discussion.  
9 My formulation here is more general than Merricks’s formulation, as it is not restricted to objects, but I cannot see any reason why 
he would object to it. 
10 This is assuming, as granted above, that particles arranged objectwise are causally sufficient for any such effect, and that particles 
arranged objectwise are numerically distinct from any objects they might compose. 
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That, in turn, is to say that there cannot be weak overdetermination of the Merricksian variety. So although 
Kim and Merricks’s strategies look different on their face, the key sentiment is the same. This has 
important implications. First, if there was strong support for the exclusion principle that would much 
strengthen Merricks’s argument. Moreover, it would pave the way for the use of overdetermination 
considerations in arguing for a more widespread elimination of entities of our ordinary ontology. If, on the 
other hand, there are good reasons to think both that baseballs and that particles arranged baseballwise are 
causally sufficient for window breakings, then the exclusion principle has to be rejected and Kim’s 
argument fails.  
4. Sufficiency and Redundancy  
The million dollar question is this: Why exactly do Kim and Merricks think that effects cannot have 
distinct but dependent sufficient causes? Surprisingly, one finds very little in the way of an answer to this 
question in either Kim or Merricks. Kim claims that the exclusion principle is “practically an analytic truth 
with not much content” (2005: 51) and Merricks apparently feels the same way about his claim that “we 
should oppose systematic overdetermination on its own demerits.” (2001: 147). But if Kim and Merricks 
think that the denial of weak overdetermination is something that we must accept without argument, they 
are wrong.  
First, let us be clear that Kim’s exclusion argument is not ‘practically an analytic truth, with not much 
content’. To be sure, there is a principle in the vicinity of the exclusion principle that fits this description. 
Namely, that no single event can have more than one independent sufficient cause occurring at any given 
time—unless it is a genuine case of overdetermination. But that is not Kim’s exclusion principle, and it is 
difficult to see how that principle could be any use in validating his argument. The important content of the 
exclusion principle, the part that takes us from the denial of overdetermination to the identification or 
elimination of causes, is the claim that no single effect can have numerically distinct and dependent sufficient 
causes occurring at the same time. That is to claim that there can be no weak overdetermination and that, I 
submit, is a very contentious claim.  
Of course, if Merricks is right, then weak overdetermination ought to be opposed on its own demerits. 
But although Merricks evidently does not think this claim requires clarification, it is far from obvious what 
these demerits might be. This is a point well made by Sider (2003). It would be very mysterious, of course, 
if standard overdetermination were systematic and pervasive, as the autonomy of the causes in question would 
make this an astonishing coincidence at best. But, as Sider points out, such worries simply do not apply where 
the causes in question are as intimately related as objects and their parts. Widespread overdetermination of 
that kind would be readily explained by the intimate relationship holding between the causes and so would 
be neither mysterious nor coincidental. Nor does there seem to be any metaphysical incoherence involved 
in thinking that there might be widespread overdetermination of this sort; which is the other obvious 
objection that springs to mind. If there were such incoherence, one would expect it to stem from some 
form of incompatibility with the nature of causation. But there does not appear to be any such 
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incompatibility.11 These points seem to me exactly right and I have nothing much to add to them. I want 
instead to press the question of what else might be wrong with weak overdetermination.  
Merricks discusses a number of considerations in his book Objects and Persons that concern whether 
overdetermination is always objectionable, but mostly his discussion is defensive and consists in rebutting 
arguments that he imagines people might have for why overdetermination is not always objectionable.12 As 
I find the considerations he offers on behalf of his imagined objectors largely besides the point I shall not 
discuss them here. I will focus instead on a positive reason that Merricks gives for why we ought always  
reject overdetermination. Namely, that overdetermination always involves redundant causes and redundancy 
is intrinsically bad. I think this worry is implicit in much of what Merricks says, but the clearest statement 
of it is probably found in the following passage:  
Consider a substance dualist … who, conceding causal closure of the physical, says that mental events 
cause physical events only by overdetermining the effects of physical causes. Pre-theoretically, that’s an 
ugly picture. The redundancy is all by itself a reason to resist this form of substance dualism. More 
generally, we always have a reason to resist systematic causal overdetermination, along with any view 
that implies it. (66-67, my underlining, original italics).  
As far as I can see, this is the only positive reason that Merricks gives us for why we ought always oppose 
overdetermination. For this to be a good reason, however, we need to be persuaded that 
overdetermination always involves redundancy and that the redundancy it involves is of an objectionable 
sort.  
In the case of standard overdetermination, the redundancy of the overdetermining causes consists in 
the fact that each cause could have been deleted from the circumstances, nothing added in its place, 
without this affecting whether the effect came about. Such redundancy is objectionable, or at least it would 
be objectionable were it widespread and systematic, because it involves causes that are in a real sense 
surplus to requirement. Relating this to the passage from Merricks quoted at the start of this section, a 
substance dualist who accepted that certain physical effects always have both a pysical cause and a mental 
cause that is a sort of optional addition to the physical cause, would be reasonably thought to be embracing 
redundancy of this kind.13 Let us assume that Merricks is right that, other things being equal, such a view 
ought to be rejected in favour of a view that does not need to embrace redundancy of this kind. That 
would not yet support his case against objects. For whatever the redundancy of objects might consist in, it 
cannot be of this form. While metaphysicians of objects disagree on whether or not particles arranged 
objectwise do in fact constitute objects, most of them agree – Merricks included – that if they do, they do 
so of metaphysical necessity. If that is right, then if there in fact were objects we simply could not delete them 
from the causal picture without thereby deleting the objectwise arrangements of particles that constitute 
them. 
Similar considerations can be brought to bear on the mental case. Practically every contemporary 
philosopher of mind believes that the mental is in somehow intimately dependent on or determined by the 
physical. Minimally, they will accept some form of the supervenience thesis, which claims that no change in 
                                                
11 Of course there might be some specific account of causation that was incompatible with the occurrence of weak overdetermination. 
But if there is, we have not been told what this account is or why we ought to accept it. In section 6 below, I discuss whether a 
productive account of causation would be incompatible with weak overdetermination. 
12 A response to Sider’s article (Merricks 2003) does little more than recap and refer back to this discussion.  
13 I do not suggest that substance dualists need to hold this.  
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the mental is possible without some corresponding change in the physical. But in addition, many (perhaps 
most) of those who accept supervenience believe that it is to be explained in terms of dependence that 
involves not just nomological but metaphysical necessitation. There are different accounts of this 
dependence, but one idea is that the mental is ‘realized’ by the physical, where “[t]o realize is to ‘make real’ 
in a sense of ‘makes’ that is constitutive rather than causal” (Shoemaker 2007: 10). How one ought 
ultimately spell out the dependence is a question I will not attempt to answer here.14 It should be noted, 
however, that if the relationship between mental and physical entities is constitutive, then it is far from clear 
that overdetermination by mental and physical entities could involve redundancy of an objectionable form. 
For you could not delete mental causes from the causal picture without thereby deleting the physical entities 
that give rise to them.15  
5. Parsimony 
You might at this point appeal to parsimony. You might argue that a theory that has dependent causes is 
an ‘ugly theory’ and that if you can do without them you should. This seems at least sometimes to be what 
is motivating Merricks, and it may form part of Kim’s motivation too. So let me say a few words about 
why I don’t think appeal to parsimony would be successful.  
Both Kim and Merricks appeal in their theories to the pluralities of physical particles and physical 
properties that play the causal roles of objects and mental properties on given occasions. Kim appeals to 
certain conjunctions of physical properties, whereas Merricks appeals to particles arranged objectwise. I 
submit further that if they are to stand a chance of giving a complete account of the causal picture, Kim 
and Merricks must appeal to such pluralities. It seems to me, however, that the need to appeal to such 
pluralities crucially undermines the claim to parsimony. First, it is not actually clear that there could be 
particles arranged tablewise, giving rise to all the properties and relations that we attribute to tables, without 
there being tables, because the conditions for there being tablewise arrangements of particles are more or 
less the same as the conditions for there being tables. This is not to say that the presence of the particles 
per se entails the presence of the table, nor even that the presence of the particles arranged in the form of a 
table entails the presence of a table. The claim is, rather, that the fact that the particles are tablewise 
arranged, which includes the assumption that all the properties that we attribute to tables are instantiated, 
entails that there is a table there. Given this, the claim that we ought to settle for particles arranged 
objectwise and abstain from objects brings to mind someone who upon being offered a slice of cake says 
‘that’s very kind, thank you, but I am on a diet so I will make do with some cake particles arranged slice-
wise.’  
The theoretical savings are, in any case, questionable. For one thing, any theoretical savings that might 
be made in the number of things the theory postulates are likely to be matched by theoretical excesses 
incurred elsewhere. For instance, if one has a theory on which there are no objects or mental properties, 
one will need a much more complicated theory of meaning, to avoid the consequence that much of our 
talk is either false or nonsensical. And that is not all. Kim and Merricks need to make room for the 
                                                
14  Shoemaker (2007) offers an account of realisation on which the causal powers of realised causes are a subset of the causal powers 
of their realisers. For an alternative, earlier version of the subset account see Jessica Wilson (1999, see also 2009).  
15 Karen Bennett (2003) argues persuasively from such considerations that mental and physical causes cannot be taken to 
overdetermine their effects in the standard sense of overdetermination.  
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(purported) realizers of objects and mental properties in their theories. They do not merely need physical 
properties and particles. They need certain pluralities of physical properties and particles. More specifically, 
they need precisely those pluralities of physical properties and particles that we ordinarily think give rise to 
mental properties and objects. But then they owe us an account of how one might identify the relevant 
pluralities without appealing to the notion of objects and mental properties. If we have no criteria for what 
the relevant pluralities of particles and properties are that are not parasitic on our notions of objects and 
mental properties then there is no theoretical saving after all.  
6. Causation as Production  
In a recent paper, Barry Loewer (2007) suggests that if we think of causation in terms of production that 
would give us reason to accept the exclusion principle. Indeed, he submits, it is precisely because Kim is 
thinking of causation in these terms that he feels no need to argue for the principle. 
My diagnosis of why Kim thinks that Exclusion is virtually analytic is that he is thinking of causation 
as production. If one thinks about causation in this way then it is quite natural to see Exclusion as 
virtually analytic. If P(x,t) literally produces Q(z,t’) then it does appear that “there is no work” left for 
any other event F(x,t) to do as far as producing Q(z,t’). Kim also seems to think of the causal relation 
as involving the transfer of some quantity, causal oomph, from the cause that brings the effect into 
existence. It is not surprising then that he would think that a second dose of oomph from F(x,t) is not 
only not needed to produce Q(zt’) there isn’t even any place for it. (Loewer, 2007, p.253) 
I do not share Loewer’s belief that a productive account of causation would justify the exclusion principle. 
Nor am I convinced that Kim would want to rely on productionism to defend the principle. But I do think 
Kim would agree that the argument Loewer offers him here is a good one. (See the next section for an 
argument of Kim’s that is similar to Loewer’s offering, except that it makes no explicit appeal to 
productionism). And it is certainly true that in recent years Kim has openly embraced productionism. In a 
companion article to Loewer’s, Kim says: 
An agent is someone who, because she has certain beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and the like, 
has the capacity to perform actions in the physical world—that is, to cause her limbs and other bodily 
parts (e.g., her vocal cords) move in appropriate ways so as to bring about changes in the natural 
course of events in the outside world—open a door, pick up the morning paper, and make a cup of 
coffee. It seems to me that without productive causation … such causal processes are not possible. 
These causal processes all involve real connectedness between cause and effect, and the connection is 
constituted by phenomena like energy flow and momentum transfer, an actual movement of some 
(conserved) physical quantity. (Kim 2007, p.236) 
Merricks too seems to be thinking of causation in terms of production. For instance, where particles 
arranged baseballwise make impact with a window, he claims that: 
…each of the window-striking atoms causes something. And when you put what one atom causes 
together with what another causes, and so on for each of the atoms arranged baseballwise, it seems like 
the cumulative effect must be the shattering of the window. (Merricks 2001, p.62) 
So it seems that both Kim and Merricks’s thinking is influenced by a productive view of causation. But 
would a productive account of causation really support the exclusion principle? And what would be the 
implications of this? 
You might grant that if causation were correctly understood as production this would indeed vindicate 
the exclusion principle and rule out weak overdetermination, but then proceed to argue that believers in 
ordinary objects and irreducible mental properties need not be too upset by this, as we need not think of 
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causation in terms of production. Indeed, you might argue further that we should not think of causation in 
terms of production. This is Loewer’s (2007) strategy. In the absence of other support for the exclusion 
principle, such a response would, if successful, show that the exclusion principle rests on an account of 
causation that is at best optional and at worst untenable. For what it’s worth, I think such a response might 
well be successful. It is not, however, the response I would like to make. I do not think we need to argue 
against the productive view of causation in order to escape the exclusion problem. For I do not believe the 
productive view of causation would vindicate the exclusion principle. If anything, it seems to me that the 
exclusion principle looks less appealing if we accept a productive account of causation. For if we are 
thinking in terms of pushing and shoving, it seems that things that stand in the relation of constitution or 
realization would just be engaged, unproblematically, in the very same pushing and shoving on a given 
occasion. 
Say I take a lump of clay, sculpt it into a statue, and then hurl it at a window with the result that the 
window breaks. Many metaphysicians want to say that the statue and the lump are numerically distinct.16 
But, on the current suggestion, a productive account of causation will not allow this. Echoing Loewer’s 
passage, if the lump’s hitting the window literally produces the window breaking, then there is no work left 
over for the statue’s hitting the window to do in producing the window breaking. More, not only is a 
second dose of oomph from the statue not needed to produce the window breaking, there is no place for 
it. All of this looks true to me. What I fail to see, however, is why this should make us believe that the 
statue, conceived as a thing numerically distinct from but constituted by the lump, could not have been 
involved in the window breaking. The natural thing to say here, it seems to me, is that the statue and the 
lump on this occasion imparted the very same causal powers on the window. If we cannot say this, we 
have not yet been told why.  
What the production account might give us is one way of making plausible that realized or constituted 
causes do not on a given occasion have any additional causal powers to the causes that realize or constitute 
them. It does nothing, however, to show that the realized or constituted causes would need to have such 
additional causal powers. And that, as I shall now argue, is the claim that Kim and Merricks’s arguments 
most crucially rest on. 
7. The Principle of Additional Causal Powers 
The moral that I would draw from the above considerations is that where two causes are as intimately 
related as objects and their particles or mental properties and the physical properties that realize them, the 
sufficiency of one cause does not entail the redundancy of the other. Interestingly, however, both Kim and 
Merricks believe that, far from providing dissolution of the problem, the dependence relationship between 
the purported causes is partly what generates the problem. Here is Kim: 
The exclusion problem doesn’t go away when we recognize the two purported causes as in some way 
related to each other, perhaps one being dependent on the other. As long as they are recognized as 
distinct events, each claiming to be a full cause of a single event, the problem remains. (1998: 53) 
                                                
16 This is because the statue and the lump of clay appear to have different properties. E.g. the lump existed before the statue did, and 
the lump could survive squashing whereas the statue could not. 
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It is important to see that the problem that we face arises because the two putative causes are not 
independent events. The difficulty is exactly that the causal status of the dependent event is threatened 
by the event on which it depends. (1998: 53).  
But why exactly should we think that the causal status of the dependent cause threatened by the cause on 
which it depends? Kim’s reason, it turns out, is that where one purported cause is intimately dependent on 
another, the dependent cause cannot bring any additional causal powers to those of the cause on which it 
depends. And this, he evidently thinks, means that the purported dependent cause couldn’t really be a 
cause after all. 
[T]here is a real problem, the exclusion problem, in recognizing second-order properties as causally 
efficacious in addition to their realizers (1998, p.53, my emphasis).  
For there is nothing in the instantiation of F on this occasion over and above the instantiation of its 
realizer H. Given this, to think that this instance of F has causal powers in excess of these of H is 
tantamount to belief in magic. (1998, p.54-55, my emphasis)17 
I think we should grant Kim that mental property instantiations do not, on any given occasion, have causal 
powers in excess of those of the property instantiations that realize them. More generally, I think we 
should grant that where one entity is realized or constituted by another, the constituted or realized entity 
could not, on any given occasion, bring with it causal powers in excess of those already brought by the entities 
that constitute it.18 I think we should deny, however, that this ‘failure’ to bring additional causal powers 
precludes dependent entities from being causes.  
This is where we reach the bedrock of Kim’s argument, and indeed of my disagreement with him. It 
boils down to the following principle, which Kim accepts and I reject:19  
The Principle of Additional Causal Powers: Where an effect has a sufficient cause C1, any numerically 
distinct and simultaneously occurring sufficient cause C2 would have to bring with it causal powers 
additional to those had by C1 in the given circumstances. 
If this principle were true, it seems it would not only make Kim’s exclusion argument successful. It would 
also make Merricks’s argument successful. For baseballs could not, according to this principle, be sufficient 
causes of window breakings, as baseballs do not, on any given occasion, bring with them causal powers 
that are additional to those of the particles arranged baseballwise on that occasion.20 Indeed, I think 
Merricks himself implicitly appeals to something like this principle. It is hinted at, for instance, in passages 
such as the following:   
Obviously enough, one would have a reason for believing that the shattering of the window is 
overdetermined only if one had a reason for believing that both the baseball and the atoms arranged 
baseballwise caused it (Merricks 2001: 72 original emphases). 
More, Merricks evidently thinks that one could have such a reason only if the baseball had causal powers in 
addition to those of the particles arranged baseballwise. He offers the following analogy:  
                                                
17 The sentiment in these passages is similar to that expressed by Loewer in the preceding section, though Kim does not (explicitly at 
least) rely here on any particular account of causation. It should be noted also that although the passages quoted appear in the context 
of a discussion of the exclusion problem as it presents itself for functionalism, Kim’s line of thought is not restricted to some 
particular version of functionalism. Indeed, Kim himself stresses that the exclusion problem “is entirely general; it arises for all 
second-order properties, whether or not they are functional.” (1998: 55).  
18 Please see section 8 for further discussion of this point. 
19 I have elsewhere, in a paper that contains precursors to some of the ides developed here, referred to this as ‘the motivating 
principle’ (see Árnadóttir and Crane 2013).  
20 I am granting Merricks here that particles arranged baseballwise have the causal powers we attribute to baseballs. For further 
thoughts on this see section 8.  
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Imagine that someone has been killed by a bullet. Now entertain the possibility that the killing was 
overdetermined by two bullets arriving simultaneously. But suppose, further, that there is no reason to 
believe that the killing was overdetermined in this way. For, let us suppose, while there is evidence for 
the existence of one bullet, there is no evidence for the existence of a second. In such a case, I think 
everyone would agree that we should deny that the killing is overdetermined as a result of a second 
bullet. For without a reason to think an effect is overdetermined, we should assume it is not. (2001: 72) 
The implication, I take it, is that while there is evidence for the existence of particles arranged baseballwise, 
there is no evidence for the existence of a baseball, given that the particles alone can account for all the 
causal work that we might attribute to the baseball, including the causal impact on our senses. These 
considerations are epistemological and are aimed at undermining the perceptual evidence that we take 
ourselves to have for the existence of objects. But the principle of additional causal powers is lurking in the 
background. The thought seems to be that if the object has no causal powers for impinging upon our 
senses additional to those of the particles arranged objectwise, then there could be no reason to believe in 
them. Something similar seems to be motivating Kim when he says:  
[I]f the causal powers of the M-instance are identical with those of its realizing P-instance, what 
reasons can we have for thinking that there are two events, not one? (Kim 1998: 56). 
The intended moral, I take it, is that if the purported second cause brings no additional causal powers to 
the first, then there could be no reason to think that it genuinely exists.  
It seems to me then that both Kim and Merricks’s arguments at least implicitly rely on the principle of 
additional causal powers. It seems to me further that both Kim and Merricks require this principle. Without 
it, we have no reason to accept either Kim’s exclusion principle or Merricks’s claim that objects do not 
overdetermine their effects. 
8. Having Causal Powers vs. Putting them in Place 
In the next section, I shall argue that we ought to reject the principle of additional causal powers. But first 
I want briefly to discuss a worry that one might have concerning the constituting or realizing entities having 
the causal powers attributed to the constituted or realized entities rather than merely putting them in place.  
Anyone who believes that mental causes are realized by physical causes will agree that the causal 
powers of mental causes are put in place in any given circumstances by the physical causes that realize 
them. And anyone who believes that objects are constituted by particles arranged objectwise will agree that 
the causal powers of objects are put in place in any given circumstances by the particles that constitute 
them. So in that sense, at least, everyone should agree that mental causes and ordinary objects cannot bring 
any additional causal powers to the scene. I.e. they cannot bring any causal powers that are not already put 
in place by their realizers or constituting entities. The way I formulated Kim and Merricks’s arguments 
above, this was the only concession they needed. But you might worry that the principle of additional 
causal powers requires more than this. It requires not only that the constituting causes put all the relevant 
causal powers in place, but that the constituting causes themselves have all these causal powers. And that, you 
might think, is not obviously a concession that the believers in irreducible mental causes and ordinary 
objects need to make. Given this, it is not clear that the principle of additional causal powers would in fact 
validate the arguments. 
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Although I think it worth noting that this line of response is possible, I will not here attempt to 
develop it. Doing so would require going into much more detail about different accounts of causation than 
I am willing or able to do here, and it would throw me off the course that I want to take. My aim is not to 
establish how exactly we should think of mental causation or object causation, but rather to show that Kim 
and Merricks’s arguments fail on their own terms. This I hope to do by identifying the most basic 
assumption on which their arguments rest and showing why we need not grant that assumption, even 
granting the other claims required for the arguments’ success. I am, in any case, inclined to agree with Kim 
and Merricks that particles arranged objectwise and physical property instantiations do, on any given 
occasion, have the causal powers that they give rise to. For it seems to me very reasonable to think that 
one way of having causal powers on a given occasion is to constitute or realize something that has them.21 
In light of this, I will grant in the ensuing discussion that the constituting or realizing causes have the 
causal powers of the would-be constituted or realized entities.  
I should stress that if it turned out that I was wrong about this, if it could be argued that the 
constituting and/or realizing causes did not in fact have all the causal powers we attribute to the would-be 
constituted and/or realized entities, that would not undermine my case against the principle of additional 
causal powers. Rather, it would give us an alternative case against Kim and/or Merricks’s use of the 
principle.22 It would allow us to argue that the principle fails to validate the argument(s). In order to 
validate their arguments, Kim and/or Merricks would then require the following strengthened version of 
the principle:  
The Strengthened Principle of Additional Causal Powers: Where an effect has a sufficient cause C1, any 
numerically distinct and simultaneously occurring sufficient cause C2 would have to bring with it 
causal powers additional to those put in place by C1 in the given circumstances. 
But, I submit, Kim and Merricks’s opponents are even less likely to accept this version of the principle 
than the version stated above. (To verify this, you are invited to plug the strengthened version into the 
arguments of the following section).  
These qualifications out of the way, I turn now to explaining why we cannot employ the principle of 
additional causal powers to make good Kim and Merricks’s arguments, even assuming that the constituting 
or realizing causes have all the causal powers we attribute to the constituted or realized causes.   
9. Rejecting the Principle of Additional Causal Powers 
Let me start by acknowledging that I think the principle of additional causal powers has some surface 
plausibility. Indeed I have found, in discussions with various colleagues, that many are inclined to accept it 
on gut feeling, although I have yet to be offered an argument in its favour. This gut reaction may partly 
explain why Kim’s argument has generated such a large variety of responses that grant the exclusion 
                                                
21 This is perhaps most obviously true if we think of causation in terms of production, though I suspect it will be true on other 
accounts of causation too, as long as we keep in the picture both the intimate relationship that holds between the causes, and the 
restriction of the causal claims to given occasions. But my inclination to agree with Kim and Merricks is not based on any particular 
account of causation, but rather on the naïve thought that what a thing (or things) can do depends on what it makes up. 
22 I say ‘Kim and/or Merricks’s use of the principle’ for one might attempt here to drive a wedge between their arguments, e.g. by 
arguing that while physical causes have the causal powers we attribute to mental causes, particles arranged objectwise do not have the 
causal powers we attribute to objects, though they do put them in place. This is what Kim himself wants to say (see his 2005, p.56).  
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principle but challenge the argument on other grounds.23 Gut reactions aside, however, I believe that closer 
inspection shows that we ought to reject the principle.   
I believe the principle of additional causal powers derives its plausibility from the plausibility of a 
similar but importantly distinct principle known as Alexander’s dictum, which claims that ‘to be is to have 
causal powers’. As we saw at the outset, versions of this principle are central to both Kim and Merricks’s 
work. Kim claims that in order to exist, mental properties must have causal powers, whereas Merricks 
claims that in order to exist, ordinary objects must have causal powers. Both of these claims are, moreover, 
intuitively plausible. The idea of an ordinary object that is absolutely devoid of causal powers is at best 
mysterious, and the idea of a property that is absolutely devoid of causal powers is no less mysterious. 
Indeed it might even be thought to be incoherent. I submit that one reason that people are attracted to the 
principle of additional causal powers is that they don’t properly distinguish it from Alexander’s dictum. It is 
very important, however, to distinguish the two principles. And it is very important to note that 
Alexander’s dictum does not entail the principle of additional causal powers.  
While Alexander’s dictum demands only that a thing have some causal powers, the principle of 
additional causal powers demands that a thing have additional causal powers. In slogan form, we might put 
this as saying that “two things cause more than one” or that “to be is to have additional causal powers”. 
This principle is stronger than Alexander’s dictum and is not entailed by it. For a thing might well have 
causal powers without having additional causal powers, in the sense intended. It is important here also that 
the principle of additional causal powers is meant to apply to particular circumstances. It claims that where an 
effect has a sufficient cause C1, any numerically distinct and simultaneously occurring sufficient cause C2 
would have to bring with it causal powers additional to those of C1 in the given circumstances. When Kim and 
Merricks demand additional causal powers, they are demanding that the entity in question have some 
additional causal powers on a given occasion. They are focussing in on singular causal statements, or the states 
of affairs that such statements describe, and demanding that the purported cause have some causal powers 
that are not on that occasion had by anything distinct from it. But I see no good reason to think that lacking 
such additional causal powers would strip a thing of its causal powers. (For some reasons to think it would 
not, see section 10 below). If Kim and Merricks know of such reasons, they do not make them explicit.  
I would argue further that it only seems plausible that lacking such additional causal powers would strip 
a thing of its causal powers if we ignore the possibility that the purported causes might be dependent. I 
would like to draw an analogy at this point, that I hope might be instructive, between Kim and Merricks’s 
reasoning and David Lewis’s ‘weight argument’ against coincident objects. Lewis says:  
It reeks of double counting to say that here we have a dishpan, and we also have a dishpan-shaped bit 
of plastic that is just where the dishpan is, weighs just what the dishpan weighs (why don’t the two 
together weigh twice as much?), and so on. This multiplication of entities is absurd on its face. (Lewis, 
1986: 252).  
A central thought here is that if the dishpan and the dishpan-shaped bit of plastic were distinct things, then 
the dishpan ought to have some additional weight to that of the plastic. In a slogan “two material objects 
                                                
23 While most philosophers of mind appear to agree that there is something wrong with Kim’s argument, people’s responses differ 
widely. Some have concluded that we must return to some form of reductive physicalism (e.g. Papineau 1990; Kim 1998, 2005), while 
others have thought that the solution lies, rather, in adopting some form of dualism (e.g. Lowe 2008). And a number of authors have 
suggested that we solve the problem by focusing either on the relata of causation (e.g. Robb 1997; Ehring 1999; Macdonald and 
Macdonald 1986; Gibb 2004) or on the causal relation (e.g. Loewer 2007; Menzies 2008; Raatikainen 2010).  
  15  15 
weigh more than one” or even perhaps “to be a material object is to have additional weight”. The 
combined weight of the dishpan and its plastic, however, is exactly the same as the weight of the plastic. 
So, the thought runs, we ought to conclude that there is no such thing as a dishpan that is distinct from the 
plastic. Although this argument gets some approving nods in the literature, it is cheap. Anyone who 
believes in distinct but coincident objects will distinguish between two kinds of non-identity; distinctness, 
which requires only that the things in question are not numerically identical, and separateness, which requires 
minimally also that the things in question be composed of different matter. The problem with the weight 
principle is that it is plausible only when restricted to separate things. If the dishpan and plastic were 
separate things, then we would of course expect their combined weight to be double that of one. But they 
are not separate things. They share all their matter. And given this, we would expect their combined weight 
to be exactly the same as the weight of one of them. Of course, there may well be good reasons for 
denying that there are distinct coincident objects. But the fact that each adds nothing to the weight of the 
other is not one of them. Indeed, arguing that coincident objects would have to add to each other’s weight 
in order to exist straightforwardly begs the question against those who claim that there are such things.  
It seems to me that the principle of additional causal powers, together with the evidential 
considerations in its favour, similarly begs the question against those who claim that there are objects and 
irreducible mental causes. Take the view that there are such things as baseballs and that baseballs are 
constituted by, but not identical to, particles arranged baseballwise. It will not do to argue against this view 
by complaining that a baseball, on a given occasion, has no causal powers in addition to those of the particles 
arranged baseballwise. For if the particles arranged baseballwise did in fact compose a baseball, this is 
precisely what you would expect. More generally, it will not do to argue against the view that particles 
arranged objectwise compose objects by complaining that an object does not, on a given occasion, have 
any causal powers in addition to those of the particles that compose it. For if particles arranged objectwise 
did in fact compose objects, then this is precisely what you would expect. In a sense – though not in the 
sense of strict numerical identity, and therein lies the gap – the baseball just is its constituting particles on 
that occasion. Given this, it seems that the baseball could not, on a given occasion, have causal powers that 
are not had by its physical realizers.24 
Similar considerations apply to the mental case. If mental causes are constituted or realized by physical 
causes, then it will not do to argue that mental causes must be identical to, rather than realized by, physical 
causes on grounds that mental causes don’t have any causal powers in excess of those of their realizers on 
any given occasion. For if mental causes were in fact realized by, rather than identical to, physical causes, 
then that is precisely what we should expect. Nothing more is required for the presence of the mental 
cause, on a given occasion, than the presence of the physical entities that realize it on that occasion. For 
instance, nothing more is required for the instantiation of a mental property on a given occasion than the 
instantiation of the physical properties that realize it on that occasion. Given this, it seems that the mental 
property could not, on any given occasion, have causal powers that are not had by its physical realizers.  
                                                
24 As explained above, I am assuming here that the particles’ arranged baseballwise giving rise to the would-be causal powers of the 
baseball on a given occasion amounts to their having these causal powers on that occasion. If this were shown to be false, Merricks 
would need to retract to the strengthened version of the principle of additional causal powers, and the strenghtened version would 
certainly be shown to be untenable by the considerations just given.  
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The moral is that the additional causal powers principle is plausible only when restricted to separate 
and independent causes. The same can be said for the evidential considerations offered by Merricks. In the 
case of the two bullets, what makes it reasonable to request extra causal evidence for the existence of the 
second bullet and to doubt the existence of the second bullet in the absence of such evidence is that the 
two purported causes are not merely numerically distinct, but also separate and independent entities. 
Where the purported causes stand in some relation of realization or constitution to one another, things 
look very different. For given the nature of such relationships we could not expect to find, when homing 
in on any given occasion, any causal evidence for the constituted entity beyond the causal evidence that we 
have for the entities that constitute it. I do not know whether there are any good reasons for denying that 
there are objects and mental properties. But if there are, the fact that objects and mental properties do not 
on any given occasion cause anything in addition to their realizers is not one of them. Indeed, claiming that 
objects and mental properties would have to have additional causal powers of this kind, or that we could 
have no reason to believe in them unless they did, in the absence of some independent arguments for these 
claims, is just to beg the question against those who claim that there are objects and mental properties.  
10. Challenges for Believers in Objects and Mental Properties 
Insofar as my task was to show that Kim and Merricks’s arguments fail and to explain how they fail, I have 
little more to say. Before concluding, however, I would like to say a few words about certain challenges 
that the arguments might be thought to raise for believers in objects and mental properties. For you might 
think that even if they are ultimately unsuccessful, the arguments nonetheless challenge the believers in 
objects and mental properties to explain how these things could play any causal role at all, and what 
reasons we could have for believing in them, given that they have no additional causal powers to those of 
their realizers on any given occasion. These are big challenges and I cannot hope to address them 
satisfactorily here. I would like to say a few words, however, that I hope will at least show that the onus is 
on the objectors to explain why we ought to think these challenges cannot be met. 
The suspicion that these challenges present a serious problem arises partly, I think, from a metaphysical 
approach that proposes to construct the world from snapshots of microphysical reality at moments in 
time. If we home in on particular causal situations, whether we are focusing on particular instantiations of 
properties or on objects and particles at particular moments in time, we are liable to lose sight of any causal 
differences between things that stand in the relation of realization or constitution. Indeed, as far as singular 
causal statements involving particular circumstances are concerned, it seems there are no causal 
differences. For there is nothing more to the realized entity on the given occasion than the realizing entity or 
entities. That is not to say, however, that there might not be any causal differences to be gleaned when we 
zoom back out. Mental properties, for instance, trace out causal explanatory patterns that are not traced 
out by any physical properties. It is not just that mental properties can be realized by different physical 
properties on different occasions, but also that the instantiation of any mental property on a given 
occasion is realized by the instantiation of a myriad of physical properties. So even as far as particular 
instantiations of mental properties are concerned, we could not hope to identify the mental property with 
any neat physical property. At best, we could hope to identify such instantiations with some plurality of 
physical property instantiations. Typically, mental properties are said to be irreducible because there are too 
many physical properties that can play their roles. But if we focus on mental properties as types or universals, 
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rather than as instantiations thereof, the problem is not really that there are too many candidate physical 
properties for mental properties to be reduced to, but that there are none. For there are in fact no physical 
properties that play the exact roles of mental properties across the various circumstances in which they are 
instantiated. Given this, if we were to reduce mental properties (types) we would first have to produce some 
physical properties (types) to reduce them to. Arguably, the moral of this is that mental properties, 
conceived of as types or universals, have causal powers not had by any neat physical properties, conceived 
of as types or universals.25 That is one reason to think that an entity might have an important causal role to 
play even though it brings no additional causal powers to its realizer(s) on a given occasion.  
Here is another reason. One could coherently hold that certain pluralities of physical properties on a 
given occasion have certain of their causal powers by virtue of realizing the relevant mental property. Put 
simply, the thought would be that the physical has certain causal powers precisely because it gives rise to the 
mental. One need not adopt any full-blown emergentist account to make sense of this thought. Just 
suppose that the very same conditions must be met for the physical realizers to have certain causal powers 
and for them to realize a given mental property. It seems plausible that there might be such conditions. 
And it seems reasonable to think that where such conditions are met this would be a case of some plurality 
of physical property instantiations simultaneously having certain causal powers and realizing a mental 
property instance that has these same causal powers. Similar considerations apply to the objects case. One 
might hold that the very same conditions must be met for particles to have or give rise to some causal 
powers and for them to compose a certain sort of object. Again, it seems plausible that there are such 
conditions. And it seems reasonable to think that where they are met this would be a case of particles 
simultaneously having certain causal powers and composing an object that has these same causal powers. 
Further, it seems natural to think that this might be a case of particles having certain causal powers 
precisely by virtue of composing an object with these causal powers. A lot more would need to be said, of 
course, but in rough outline, these ideas look coherent. If they are, then an entity may have a distinctive 
and important causal role to play even though it adds nothing, on a given occasion, to the causal powers of 
its realizers.  
How about the second question? What reasons could we have for believing in objects and mental 
properties? I do not think it incumbent on the believer in objects to answer this question. Pre-theoretically, 
it seems we have every reason to believe in objects and mental properties. If we were to accept that we do 
not in fact have such reasons, then we would need to be presented with some very strong theoretical 
defeaters of our reasons. The burden of proof is very much on those who argue that there are no objects 
and/or mental properties. Kim believes that the fact that mental properties do not have additional causal 
powers to those of their realizers on a given occasion seriously undermines our reasons to believe that 
there are mental properties distinct from these realizers. Similarly, Merricks believes that the fact that 
objects do not have additional causal powers to those of their would-be constituting particles on a given 
occasion seriously undermines our reasons to believe that there are any objects. But Kim and Merricks still 
owe us arguments for why we ought to accept these claims. In the absence of such arguments, the 
principle of additional causal powers and the evidential considerations in its favour beg the question 
against believers in objects and mental properties.  
                                                
25 I hasten to add that if any form of physicalism is true, then these causal powers will of course be determined by physical properties.  
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11. Concluding Remarks 
In assessing overdetermination arguments, we must keep firmly in mind the distinction between a thing’s 
making a causal difference and a thing’s making an additional causal difference to that of the phenomena 
that give rise to it on a given occasion. When you throw a baseball at a window it does make a causal 
difference. But it does not make an additional causal difference to that exerted by the particles arranged 
baseballwise in these particular circumstances. In his book, Physicalism or something near enough, Kim says: “If the 
argument goes wrong, one would like to know just where and how it goes wrong.” It will need to be 
shown, he continues “that there are these causal relations in addition to the underlying physical causal 
processes” (Kim, 2005, p.54). I think this last sentence is instructive about where both Kim and Merricks’s 
arguments go wrong. They go wrong precisely in assuming that if a is not identical to b, then one must 
always add something to a circumstance in which you already have b in order to get a. They go wrong in 
assuming that if a is not identical to b, then a must be something over and above b, on that particular occasion. 
On a metaphysical picture on which things stand in the realization or constitution to one another this 
assumption is not warranted. For on such a picture, there are ways of being nothing over and above, on a given 
occasion, that do not involve identity. If the believers in objects and irreducible mental causes are right, 
then for the same reason that objects and mental causes would not add anything to the picture, they also 
do not need adding to the picture. They are already there. Indeed, they are necessarily there. Once this is 
appreciated, the threat of exclusion and elimination of both ordinary objects and causally efficacious 
mental entities evaporates. 26 
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